The effect of learning on climate policy is not straightforward when climate policy is concerned. It depends not only on the ways that climate feedbacks, preferences, and economic impacts are considered, but also on the ways that uncertainty and learning are introduced. Deep (or fat-tailed) uncertainty does matter for the optimal climate policy in that it requires more stringent efforts to reduce carbon emissions. However, learning may reveal thin-tailed uncertainty, weakening the case for emission abatement: learning reduces the stringency of the optimal abatement efforts relative to the no learning case even when we account for deep uncertainty. In order to investigate this hypothesis, we construct an endogenous (Bayesian) learning model with fat-tailed uncertainty on climate change and solve the model with stochastic dynamic programming. In our model a decision maker updates her belief on the total feedback factors through temperature observations each period and takes a course of action (carbon reductions) based on her belief. With various scenarios, we find that the uncertainty is partially resolved over time, although the rate of learning is relatively slow, and this materially affects the optimal decision: the decision maker with a possibility of learning lowers the effort to reduce carbon emissions relative to the no learning case. This is because the decision maker fully utilizes the information revealed to reduce uncertainty, and thus she can make a decision contingent on the updated information. In addition, with incorrect belief scenarios, we find 2 that learning enables the economic agent to have less regrets (in economic terms, sunk benefits or sunk costs) for her past decisions after the true value of the uncertain variable is revealed to be different from the initial belief.
that learning enables the economic agent to have less regrets (in economic terms, sunk benefits or sunk costs) for her past decisions after the true value of the uncertain variable is revealed to be different from the initial belief. 1 1. Introduction "The acquisition of information has value, which it would not have in a world of certainty." (Arrow, 1957: 524) Following this notion, economists have investigated the effects of learning on policy, including the irreversibility effect, the value of information, the optimal timing of action, the rate of learning, the direction of learning, and the cost of learning.
1 The answers to these questions, however, are not straightforward especially when climate policy is concerned. They depend not only on the ways that climate feedbacks, preferences, and economic impacts are considered, but also on the ways that uncertainty and learning are introduced.
The general framework for the problem of decision making under uncertainty and learning about climate change is as follows (Pindyck, 2000; 2002) . In an economy where the impacts of climate change are uncertain with a possibility of learning, a decision maker encounters conflicting risks: a risk that stringent emissions control today turns out to be unnecessary ex post (sunk costs) and a risk that much stronger efforts are required in the future (sunk benefits). If there is no irreversibility to be considered, the problem becomes trivial since the decision maker can revise her actions as and when required. However, both the investment in emissions control and the accumulation of greenhouse gases are, at least partially, irreversible. In the presence of the irreversibility, the decision maker generally favors an option that preserves flexibility (Arrow and Fisher, 1974; Henry, 1974) . As far as climate policy is concerned, since there are two kinds of counteracting irreversibility, the problem becomes complicated. The relative magnitude of the effects of the irreversibility determines the direction and the magnitude of the effect of learning on policy: the irreversibility related to carbon accumulation strengthens abatement efforts whereas the capital irreversibility lowers abatement.
Alternatively, we can think of the problem as an optimal experimentation with emissions in the framework of learning by doing (Arrow, 1961; Grossman et al., 1977) . The decision maker confronted with uncertainty and a possibility of learning about the impacts of climate change can be interpreted as a Bayesian statistician who experiments with a level of carbon emissions to gain information about uncertainty. The more emissions (in turn, higher temperature increases) are more informative in the sense that it provides more precise information about uncertain parameters such as climate sensitivity. However, the acquisition of information comes at an implicit cost: higher emissions induce consumption losses (via increased temperature). As a result, the decision maker should choose an optimal level of emissions by comparing gains and losses from the acquisition of information.
In the literature, the possibility of learning generally changes the near-term policy towards higher emissions relative to the case where the uncertainty is not reduced (for the summary of the literature see Ingham et al., 2007) . One reason for this is that constraints such as the non-negativity of carbon emissions rarely bite in climate change models (Ulph and Ulph, 1997) . 2 In addition, even if they do bind, the effect of the (partially) irreversible accumulation of carbon stocks is smaller than the effect of the irreversible capital investment in emissions control (Kolstad, 1996) . 3 If 1 The relevant literature for these issues on climate change is as follows: the irreversibility effect (Kolstad, 1996a; Ulph and Ulph, 1997) , the value of information (Peck and Teisberg, 1993; Nordhaus and Popp, 1997) , the optimal timing of action (Pindyck, 2000 (Pindyck, , 2002 Guillerminet and Tol, 2008) , the rate of learning (Kolstad, 1996b; Kelly and Kolstad, 1999; Leach, 2007; Webster et al., 2008) , and the direction of learning (Oppenheimer et al., 2008) .
we think of the results in the framework of learning by doing, these results imply that the experimentation with more carbon emissions is more informative in the sense that the decision maker can attain more utility from the experimentation (Blackwell, 1951 ).
In the current paper we add another perspective on the literature. That is, where previous papers studied thin-tailed distributions, we here focus on fat-tailed ones. 4 Fat-tailed uncertainty (or deep uncertainty) may lead to different results since the marginal damage costs of climate change become far larger, if not arbitrarily large, under deep uncertainty (Tol, 2003; Weitzman, 2009) . Consequently, sunk benefits may outweigh sunk costs under the possibility of learning, and this may change climate policy in favor of more stringent efforts to reduce emissions compared to the no learning case.
However, learning may of course reveal thin-tailed uncertainty (about social welfare), weakening the case for emissions abatement. 5 That is, learning reduces the optimal level of emissions control rates even when we account for deep uncertainty. We develop a dynamic model on climate change introducing deep uncertainty and learning to investigate this hypothesis. Learning in our model is endogenous: the decision maker updates her belief about a parameter, expressed in a probability distribution, by the acquisition of information. Our approach on endogenous learning is not new in the literature on the economics of climate change. For instance, Kelly and Kolstad (1999) introduce uncertainty about a climate parameter (linearly related to climate sensitivity) into the DICE model, and then investigate the expected learning time. Leach (2007) follows a similar model and approach, but introduces an additional uncertainty on climate parameters. Webster et al. (2008) investigate the effect of learning on the near term policy using the DICE model with a discrete four-valued climate sensitivity distribution and exogenous learning. In the second part of their paper, they investigate the time needed to reduce the uncertainties about climate sensitivity and heat uptake by using a simplified climate model. They incorporate fat-tailed uncertainty and Bayesian learning into the model but their model does not analyze policy. The current paper is different from the literature in that we investigate the effect of learning on climate policy using an endogenous learning model incorporating fat-tailed uncertainty. 6 In specific, unlike the literature, we investigate the optimal level of emissions control under the possibility of endogenous learning as well as the rate of learning. In addition, through various scenarios such as the incorrect belief cases, we compare the benefits of learning.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes the model and computational methods. We revise the DICE model (Nordhaus, 2008) to represent (deep) uncertainty and endogenous learning about the equilibrium climate sensitivity through the framework of feedback analysis (Hansen et al, 1984; Roe and Baker, 2007) . We solve the infinite time horizon model using the method of dynamic programming. Section 3 presents the posterior distribution of the total feedback factors and the climate sensitivity. We compare the rate of learning with various sensitivity analyses. Section 4 illustrates the effect of learning on climate policy. We investigate the case where the initial belief on the climate sensitivity is correct in the sense that the true value of the climate sensitivity turns out to be the same as the expected value of the initial belief of the decision maker. Then we compare the results with the other cases where the initial belief of the decision maker turns out to be incorrect. Section 5 investigates the value of learning. Finally, Section 6 concludes.
3

Model and methods
The revised DICE model
We revise the DICE model to introduce uncertainty and learning. There are several distinct differences with the original DICE model. First, the current model incorporates (deep) uncertainty. The key uncertain parameter in the model is the equilibrium climate sensitivity. Second, the probability density function (PDF) of the total feedback factors, and thus the PDF of the climate sensitivity, changes over time through temperature observations. 7 As a result, the mean and the variance of the total feedback factors become endogenous state variables (see below). Third, we apply a simple variant of energy balance model for atmospheric temperature evolution to represent the total feedback factors explicitly. Furthermore, we introduce stochastic shocks into the temperature equation for Bayesian updating on the PDF of the total feedback factors (Equation (5)). Temperature shocks reflect uncertainty about observational errors, model's biases to match observations, and the natural variability (Webster et al., 2008) . Fourth, we consider an infinite time-horizon problem and apply a solution method suitable for the endogenous learning model (see Section 2.3). To this end, we modify some specifications of the DICE model for computational convenience. In specific, we apply a simple one-box model for the evolution of carbon stocks (Equation (4)). Our model does not consider a backstop technology for the abatement costs function. In addition, unlike the DICE model, the time period t in our model is annual and thus some parameter values including and the parameters in Equation (5) and (6) are adjusted. There is an upper limit of 6,000 GtC for the accumulated carbon emissions in DICE but the current model does not include this constraint. Finally, the utility of consumption is not weighted by the level of population in the objective function (Equation (1)).
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As with the original DICE model, the (partial) irreversibility is represented by the depreciation rates of carbon stocks and capital stocks (Equation (3), (4)) together with the non-negativity of emissions ( ≤ 1). We assume that learning is costless.
The model is specified as follows:
The equilibrium climate sensitivity is a measure of the responsiveness of climate system to radiative forcing. It denotes how much atmospheric temperature changes when carbon concentration doubles. The feedback factor refers to the impact of a physical factor such as water vapor and cloud on radiative forcing in a way that amplifies the response of climate system (Hansen et al., 1984) .
8 Simulations with population-weighted objective function produce the similar results qualitatively as the results in this paper.
9 Unless otherwise noted, the parameter values and the initial values for the state variables (in the year 2005) are the same as in DICE 2007. The exceptions are the elasticity of marginal utility of consumption ( ) and the exponent of the abatement cost function ( ). We use 1 for and 2 for (instead of 2 and 2.8, respectively in DICE 2007) because of the computational convenience in deriving the first-order conditions (see Section 2.3 and Appendix A). The value of 1 for is in the plausible range of the elasticity of marginal utility of consumption (Gollier 2000) . A logarithmic utility function ( =1) is used in the older version of DICE, for instance. The lower implies the less concavity of utility function, and thus the less aversion to risk and the more aversion to inequality. The marginal abatement costs are linear in our model since we use 2 for . Ulph and Ulph (1997) apply the quadratic abatement costs function, among others.
where is the expectation operator given information at point in time t, is the instantaneous utility of per capita consumption, is consumption, is the level of population (exogenous), is the total factor productivity (exogenous), (= ) is the abatement cost function, (=1/( )) is the damage function, (= ) is the production function, is the emissions control rate, is the gross investment, is the capital stock, is the carbon stock in the atmosphere, is the atmospheric temperature deviation (from 1900), is the lower ocean temperature deviation (from 1900), is the total feedback factors normally distributed with mean ̅ (the initial value is 0.65 following Roe and Baker (2007) ) and variance (the initial value is 0.13 2 following Roe and Baker (2007)), is the stochastic temperature shocks normally distributed with mean 0 and variance (=0. 11 2 following Leach (2007) ), is the emission-output ratio (exogenous), is the radiative forcing from non-CO 2 gases (exogenous), is carbon emissions from the sources other than energy consumption (exogenous), is the elasticity of marginal utility of consumption (=1), is the discount factor, is the pure rate of time preference (=0.015), is the elasticity of output with respect to capital (=0.3), (= 0.1) and (=0.00833 following Leach (2007) ) are the depreciation rates, respectively of the capital stock and the carbon stock, is the pre-industrial carbon stocks in the atmosphere (=596.4GtC), (=0), (=0.0028388), (=2), (=0.0561), (=2), (=0.005), (=0.06967), (=0.92373), (=0.12061), (=0.0066), (=0.022) are parameters.
Bayesian learning
The temperature response model in the current paper is a simple variant of the energy balance model of Baker and Roe (2009) . In their model, the temperature of the ocean mixed layer obeys the following equation:
|
, where is the density, is the specific heat, is the depth of the mixed layer, is the thermal conductivity, z is the ocean depth below the mixed layer, and is the temperature at depth z. With a twobox (mixed layer and deep ocean) simplification, the above equation reduces to Equation (5) (without stochastic shocks) and Equation (6) (Marten, 2011).
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The decision maker updates her belief on the total feedback factors through temperature observations each timeperiod in our model. This representation enables us to consider deep uncertainty because the climate sensitivity is related to the total feedback factors as in Equation (9) (Roe and Baker, 2007) . In this relation together with the assumption on the distribution of the total feedback factors described below, the climate sensitivity has a highly skewed distribution to the upper end (see Figure 1 ).
where is the equilibrium climate sensitivity, (=1.2°C following Roe and Baker (2007) ) is the reference climate sensitivity in the grey-body planet (no feedback effects).
We introduce stochastic shocks into the atmospheric temperature equation. The stochastic shocks are assumed to have a normal distribution with mean 0 and a constant variance. Although the shocks are independent, Equations (5) and (6) imply a first-order autoregressive model (Kelly and Kolstad, 1999) . In this representation, the decision maker expects that the atmospheric temperature in the next period is determined by the following equation:
. However, the actual realization of the atmospheric temperature is determined by the true value of the total feedback factors (which is not known to the decision maker ex ante with certainty: parametric uncertainty) and the realized stochastic shocks (which is never known to the decision maker before realization: stochasticity). Put differently, there is deviation between the decision maker's expectation and observations, which leads to the modification of the prior belief. The decision maker in our model obtains the posterior distribution of the total feedback factors by the Bayes Rule as follows.
where is the prior belief on the total feedback factors, | is the likelihood function of the observations given , and | is the posterior belief.
We use an expert prior for the distribution of the total feedback factors: namely, the normal distribution of Roe and Baker (2007) . The normal priors have some advantages over the other priors. First, the posterior calculated from the normal prior is also normally distributed, provided that the likelihood function is also normal. In this case, it is easy to calculate the posterior just by investigating the posterior mean and the variance (Cyert and DeGroot, 1974) . Second, as Annan and Hargreaves (2011) point out, uniform priors usually used in a Bayesian analysis assign too much probability to extreme parameter values (say, climate sensitivity of 10°C/2xCO 2 ) beyond the current scientific knowledge. 12 This assignment may dominate the calculation of the expected damage costs.
The resulting posterior has the normal distribution with mean ̅̅̅̅̅ and variance as in Equation (7) and (8). 13 In the subsequent period, the decision maker uses the previously calculated posterior as the prior. In this way, the decision maker updates her belief every time-period.
The variance of the total feedback factors decreases over time. Put differently, the acquisition of information in our model always increases the precision of the decision maker's belief. Furthermore, as the variance gets smaller, the 11 Kelly and Kolstad (1999) and Leach (2007) apply the similar approach to ours, but the decision makers in their models update beliefs on the (normally distributed) climate parameter so they do not account for fat-tails. In addition, updating the PDF of the total feedback factors is more appropriate than updating the PDF of the climate sensitivity in that the observable parameters are not the climate sensitivity but the feedback factors (Allen et al., 2005) .
mean approaches to the true value of the total feedback factors, on average (Equation (7)). That is, there is no 'negative' learning (Oppenheimer et al., 2008) in this model. One thing to add is that, although the variance becomes smaller as the temperature observations accumulate, the climate sensitivity has still fat tails, unless the variance becomes equal to 0, in the sense that its density diminishes more slowly than exponentially (Kelly and Tan, 2012).
Computational methods
There are generally two kinds of methods for solving a learning model numerically: stochastic optimization and dynamic programming. The first one is to consider possible states of the world on parameter values of interest with corresponding probability distributions, and solve for the optimal time path of policy variables that maximize the expected value of the objective function over a finite time horizon (e.g. Kolstad, 1996; Webster et al., 2008) . The second one is to formulate the problem in a recursive way (a functional equation) and then solve the problem over an infinite time horizon (e.g. Kelly and Kolstad, 1999; Leach, 2007) . The current paper takes the second approach: dynamic programming. 14 We illustrate the general approach of the current paper below and the solution methods in detail are given in Appendix A.
We formulate the problem as the following. The Bellman equation is:
where is the value of the maximized objective function, Equation (1), starting from period t (value function), is the vector of control variables ( , ), is the vector of state variables ( , M, , , ̅ , v) , and is the vector of uncertain variables (f, ).
Then we approximate value function with flexible basis function having a specific analytic form such as polynomials or a logarithmic function.
∑ (12)
where is the basis function, is the vector of coefficients for the basis function.
Following this way, we change the maximization problem into the regression problem: finding of the basis function that minimizes the approximation errors. The algorithm for finding is summarized as follows. First, choose an initial guess on Second, simulate a time series satisfying the first order necessary conditions (see Appendix A), the initial conditions (the initial values for the state variables), and the transitional equations (Equation (3) - (8)) with the initial guess.
15 Third, compare the left-hand side and the right-hand side of Equation (11), and then iterate simulations with updated if the difference is higher than the pre-specified tolerance level (see Appendix A for the updating rule and the stopping rule). 16 Fourth, if the difference meets the stopping rule, stop the iteration. This is the method proposed by Maliar and Maliar (2005) , and it reduces the computational burden in that 14 For the general discussion on recursive methods and applications of computational methods for dynamic programming, see Stocky and Lucas (1989) , Rust (1996), and Judd (1998) .
15 If the initial guess is chosen, we can calculate the control variables from the first order necessary conditions, the initial values for state variables, and the transitional equations. In this way, the resulting time series depend on . 16 For the calculation of the conditional expectation, we use the Gauss-Hermite quadrature method (Judd, 1998) .
it searches for a solution in a set satisfying the necessary conditions (an ergodic set). 17 Once found, the solution attains the fixed point of the Bellman equation, which is the unique solution for the maximization problem (Equation (1)) (Stocky and Lucas, 1989) .
3. The resolution of uncertainty 3.1. Climate sensitivity distribution
According to the updating procedure presented in the previous section, the belief of the decision maker on the true value of the total feedback factors changes as the (annual) temperature observations accumulate. Figure 1 shows the evolution of the parameter values of the total feedback factors distribution, the corresponding distributions of the climate sensitivity, and the tail probabilities. Following the current scientific knowledge on the total feedback factors distribution (Roe and Baker, 2007) , we present the case where the true value of the total feedback factors is 0.65 (except the top left panel: we use 0.70 there for an illustration purpose. From the top left panel, we can observe how the expected value of the decision maker approaches the true value as observations accumulate over time) and the initial belief on the total feedback factors is the normal distribution with mean 0.65 and standard deviation 0.13. Regarding other assumptions for simulation, see Appendix A. Considering random realizations of the temperature shocks, throughout the paper for the learning case, we present the average of 10,000 Monte Carlo simulations.
Since the mean changes, we consider the coefficient of variation --the standard deviation divided by the mean --as a measure of uncertainty. We define learning as a decrease in the coefficient of variation as Webster et al. (2008) do. 18 In this definition, the decision maker learns every year as we can see from the top left panel. As argued in the previous section, the mean approaches the true value of the total feedback factors and the variance decreases as the temperature observations accumulate over time. The coefficient of variation also falls over time. The top right and the bottom left panel show the climate sensitivity distributions corresponding to the baseline case: the true value of the total feedback factors is 0.65 and the prior belief on the total feedback factors is normal distribution with mean 0.65 and standard deviation 0.13. The density on the tails becomes much smaller as time goes by, and thus the precision (defined as the reciprocal of variance) of the belief increases. The bottom right panel illustrates the (right) tail property of the climate sensitivity distribution of the reference case. As expected, the tail probability decreases as learning takes place. For instance, the probability that climate sensitivity is above 6°C is 0.12 in 2005, but it decreases to 0.076 and 0.014 in 2050 and 2100, respectively. Since the tail probability gets smaller over time, the value of climate sensitivity below which a significant percent lie (a percentile) also decreases. ) percentile, it takes 65 years (resp., 100 years) to set an upper bound on climate sensitivity below 6°C.
The rate of learning
The rate of learning is as important as the magnitude of learning since slow learning may lead to incapability for us to take appropriate actions on time because of the irreversibility. Especially when we consider the possibility of (discontinuous) climate catastrophes such as a collapse of the West-Antarctic Ice Sheet (Guillerminet and Tol, 2008) and the thermohaline circulation collapse (Keller et al., 2004) , we should put more importance on the rate of learning. Furthermore, fast learning enables more efficient allocation of resources. In order to investigate the rate of learning, we normalize the coefficient of variation so that the initial value (in 2005) is equal to 1. Figure 2 shows the results. We present some sensitivity analyses together with the baseline case. First of all, the time needed to reduce the uncertainty (about the total feedback factors) is relatively long in the baseline case: it takes 67 years (respectively, 164 years) to reduce the uncertainty by 50% (resp., 90%). 20 Learning is faster (respectively, slower)
when the true value of the total feedback factors is higher (resp., lower) than the initial belief. This is intuitive in that the higher total feedback factors imply the higher temperature increases, resulting in the lower variance (see Equation (5) and (8)). In the similar fashion, the rate of learning is increasing in emissions. In order to verify this, we perturb emissions by one unit (1GtC) per year from the optimal solution. 21 The top right panel shows the results. A unit increase (respectively, decrease) in emissions from the optimal path reduces (resp., increases) the uncertainty. The more deviations in emissions are, the higher deviations in the rate of learning are.
The rate of learning is highly sensitive to the variance of the temperature shocks. For instance, if the standard deviation of temperature shocks is reduced to 0.05 (the baseline case is 0.11), the time needed to reduce the uncertainty is almost halved relative to the baseline case: it takes 32 years (respectively, 88 years) to reduce the uncertainty by 50% (resp., 90%). The bottom right panel illustrates the sensitivity of the rate of learning to the initial level of uncertainty. Since the coefficient of variation differs from case to case, we do not normalize the coefficient of variation in this panel. We observe that the coefficient of variation converges to a certain (low) level during the late 22 nd century. In other words, differences in the initial level of uncertainty become irrelevant after 150 years or so in our learning model. This is because the rate of learning is higher in a more uncertain world. Nevertheless, there are substantial differences in uncertainty in the near future.
The effect of learning
We investigate the effect of learning on climate policy. To this end, we compare 3 cases: (1) Deterministic, (2) Uncertainty (no learning), and (3) Learning. The deterministic case refers to the case where the decision maker does not consider uncertainty. The uncertainty case refers to the case where the decision maker accounts for uncertainty, but her belief remains unchanged. The information may accumulate, but the decision maker simply ignores the possibility of learning or chooses to ignore the information gathered. Finally, the belief of the decision maker is subject to change in the learning case. The decision maker fully utilizes the information acquired from the temperature observations so that she can make a decision contingent on the information. Throughout this section, the initial belief on the total feedback factors is represented by the normal distribution with mean 0.65 and standard deviation 0.13. The true value of the total feedback factors is 0.65 in Section 4.1.
In our learning model, atmospheric temperature evolves according to the true value of the total feedback factors, but the decision maker conducts a course of action according to her belief. Then what if our belief on uncertain variables turns out to be incorrect? In order to answer to this question we simulate our model with an assumption that the true value of the total feedback factors, ex post, turns out to be different from the decision maker's initial belief in Section 4.2. We consider two scenarios. First, the true value of the total feedback factors turns out to be higher than the initial belief ('H' case: f=0.70 > =0.65). Second, the true value turns out to be lower than the initial expectation ('L' case: f =0.60 < =0.65). Figure 3 summarizes the effect of learning, which is generally consistent with the literature as we briefly introduced in Section 1. First, fat-tailed uncertainty greatly increases the abatement efforts relative to the deterministic case. This is because the uncertainty model considers the less probable but the more dismal future as well as the most probable (mode) or the expected state of the world. For instance, the optimal emissions control rate around the year 2030 reaches 50% and the irreversibility constraints (nonnegative emissions) start to bind after the year 2180 when we account for fat tailed uncertainty. Whereas in the deterministic case, the optimal level of emissions control rates in 2030 is below 30%. Second, the possibility of learning reduces the abatement efforts relative to the uncertainty case. Although the atmospheric temperature increases more in the learning case than in the uncertainty case (see the right panel, this is because carbon emissions are greater in the learning case as a result of lower emissions control rates), the decision maker attains (slightly) more consumption (in turn, utility) from the learning case. This implies that the experimentation with more emissions (or learning) is beneficial to the decision maker. Figure 4 illustrates the results for the case of incorrect belief. The first thing we observe is that the optimal decision changes a lot according to the true value of the total feedback factors. Especially in the uncertainty case the emissions control rates are very sensitive to the true values, and thus the resulting temperature increases and the consumption vary a lot more relative to the learning case. Compared to the uncertainty case, the changes in optimal emissions, temperature deviations, and consumption are small in the learning case. This is because learning enables the decision maker to adjust her actions according to the information revealed. Second, the possibility of learning lowers the optimal level of emissions control rates in the incorrect belief case as in the correct belief case. Third, as one would expect, the optimal control rates are lower (respectively, higher) when the true value of the total feedback factors turns out to be lower (resp., higher). Atmospheric temperature deviations change in the opposite direction of the control rates. Fourth, the decision maker attains higher consumption when the true value of the total feedback factors turns out to be lower than expected.
Correct belief
Incorrect belief
The benefits of learning
In this section we investigate the benefits of learning. Table 1 illustrates the optimal carbon tax and the net present value of utility of each scenario in Figure 4 . The optimal carbon tax is much higher in the uncertainty case than in the deterministic case and it is decreased in the learning case. When the true value of the uncertain variable turns out to be higher (respectively, lower) than expected the gain from learning becomes higher (resp., lower). We also observe that learning is valuable in that it increases social welfare. The net present value of utility (or social welfare to be maximized by the decision maker) is increased when we account for the possibility of learning. In addition, social welfare is higher (respectively, lower) when the true value turns out to be lower (resp., higher). The only exception is UNC_L case, where the decision maker does not account for the possibility of learning and the true value turns out to be lower than her belief. In this scenario, social welfare is higher than in the learning case (LRN_L). One of the possible reasons for this is that 1) investment is higher in the learning case than in the uncertainty case (see Appendix B) and 2) as we can see from Figure 4 , there are no significant differences in abatement efforts and temperature increases between UNC_L and LRN_L cases (see the green lines in top and bottom panels), hence no significant differences in abatement costs and damage costs (see Figure 5 ). Since consumption is calculated as production net of investment, damage costs, and abatement costs (see Equation (2)), consumption is higher in UNC_L case than in LRN_L case, and hence the higher utility in the uncertainty case. However, the gross income defined as the sum of consumption and investment (or the gross production net of abatement costs and damage costs) is higher in LRN_L case than in UNC_L case (see Appendix B).
In order to see the value of learning in a different perspective, let us suppose that the decision maker in the uncertainty case somehow choose to change her strategy about learning in a specific time period, say in the year 2100. That is, the decision maker starts to update her belief after the year 2100 based on temperature observations. With this assumption, we can calculate sunk benefits or sunk costs of the decision maker's past decisions: the difference in the total costs (sum of damage costs and the abatement costs) between the uncertainty case and the learning case represents the benefits of learning. Figure 5 shows the results. Considering the differences in the gross production and investment in each case, we present the costs as a fraction of the gross production of each case. As illustrated in the previous section, the optimal emissions control rates are lower in the learning case than in the uncertainty case, and thus the abatement costs are lower but the damage costs are higher in the learning case. The total costs are lower in the learning case than in the uncertainty case. For instance, the total costs are 0.26% point (as a fraction of the gross world output) lower in the learning case than in the uncertainty case in 2100. When the true value of the total feedback factors turns out to be higher (respectively, lower) than expected, the decision maker will find that emissions control rates have been unnecessarily lower (resp., higher) than required, but she cannot revise her past actions. That is, there are sunk benefits in H case and sunk costs in L case. The benefits of learning (or penalties for no-learning) become higher (respectively, lower) when the true value of the uncertain variable turns out to be higher (resp., lower) than the initial belief. Those values in 2100 are 2.10% point and 0.05% point (as a fraction of the gross world output) in H case (f=0.70 > =0.65) and L case (f=0.60 < =0.65), respectively.
Conclusion
We constructed an endogenous (Bayesian) learning model with a fat-tailed uncertainty on climate change and solved the model with a stochastic dynamic programming. In our model the decision maker updates her belief on the total feedback factors through temperature observations and takes a course of action (carbon reductions) each period based on her belief. With various scenarios, we find that the uncertainty is partially resolved over time, although the rate of learning is relatively slow, and this materially affects the optimal decision. Consistent with the literature, the decision maker with a possibility of learning lowers the effort to reduce carbon emissions relative to the no learning case (or the uncertainty case). This is because the decision maker fully utilizes the information revealed to reduce uncertainty, and thus she can make a decision contingent on the updated information. In addition, with incorrect belief scenarios, we find that learning enables the economic agent to have less regret (in economic terms, sunk benefits or sunk costs) for the past decisions after the true value of the uncertain variable is revealed to be different from the initial belief. The optimal decisions in the learning case are less sensitive to the true value of the uncertain variable than those in the uncertainty case. The reason is that learning lets uncertainty converge to the true value of the state in a sense that the variance approaches 0 as information accumulates. Deep uncertainty does matter for the optimal climate policy in that it requires more stringent efforts to reduce emissions. However, learning reduces such effect of deep uncertainty on climate policy. As one learns more, the effect of uncertainty becomes less.
Finally, we raise some caveats and suggest further researches. First, our model does not take into account the possibility of negative learning. Indeed, as Oppenheimer et al. (2008) argued, learning does not necessarily converge to the true value of the uncertain variable. The effect of the negative learning will be different from the results of this paper, of course. Since it is beyond the scope of this paper, we refer this to further researches. Second, for simplicity, we assume that learning is costless in this paper, but in reality learning comes at a cost. The value and the rate of learning depend on the cost of learning as well as on the benefit of learning. The inclusion of the cost of learning may complicate the model, but the main implications of this paper will hold unless learning costs more than it earns. Third, we only consider learning from temperature observations. In reality, there are more active forms of leaning such as research and development (Kolstad, 1996) . An active learning model incorporates the optimal decision on activities such as R&D investment for reducing uncertainty, which is an important issue that should be considered in further research. Fourth, we use the logarithmic utility function and the quadratic abatement costs function for computational convenience. Since a climate-economy model includes many nonlinear functions, it is not easy to derive the optimal policy rules satisfying the first order conditions, which is a necessary step for the solution method of this paper. Approximations of such nonlinear functions to tractable functional forms may help apply the solution method. This Appendix illustrates the detailed solution methods for the learning model of the current paper. This provides additional information to Section 2.3. We approximate the value function in Equation (11) as the following Equation (A1). We use the logarithmic function as the basis function. 22 Since f represents a parametric uncertainty and is a white noise by assumptions, Equation (12) reduces into Equation (A1).
where the notations are the same as in the core text except is the per capita capital and is the normalized carbon stock.
In order to avoid an ill-conditioned problem during regression, we normalize the economic variables by the level of population and the carbon stocks by the preindustrial level ( ). In addition, we apply the least-square method using a singular value decomposition (SVD) (Judd et al., 2011) .
The first order necessary conditions for the Bellman equation (Equation 11) are as follows.
(A2)
where is the law of motions for state variables (Equation (3) -(8) ). The resulting policy rules for the emissions control rates and the gross investments are functions of the current state variables and the coefficients of the basis function as follows (for analytical tractability, we assume that the elasticity of marginal utility of consumption is 1 and of the abatement costs function is 2).
22 As a basis function we choose a logarithmic function because it is convenient for finding the solutions (Equation (A3) and (A4)) satisfying the first order conditions. The alternatives as a basis function are ordinary polynomials or Chebyshev polynomials (Judd et al, 2011) . The logarithmic function has an advantage in that the objective function of the decision maker has the similar functional form (Note that we use a logarithmic utility function). A11). Applying the above mentioned method, we find the optimal time paths for consumption and capital (the maximum tolerance level is 10 -9
). We use the same parameter values for solving this simple model.
(A10)
(A11) Figure A1 shows the results. The economy approaches the equilibrium and the variables stabilize. Note that since we are dealing with an infinite time horizon problem, consumption is small relative to income (for more on this point, see Gollier, 2000) . 
